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Conventional development economics has  Development is a function not just of
focused mainly on generating economic growth  promoting the right industries and allocating
by mobilizing savings and allocating them  capital for the high-retum investments (asset
wisely among invesntment  opportunities. Savings  management) but also of choosing the right
(extemal and domestic) were to be mobilized  financial structure (liability management) - and
through tax incentives, income, and interest rate  of the related risks arising from the liability mix
policies. Their allocation often involved direct  chosen.
gove.nment intervention in the investment
process.  Sheng and Cho argue that one of the ingredi-
ents of the East Asian success is prudent risk
After the disastrous results of the 198(es,  the  management by these govemments. Sheng and
new wisdom is to let the private sector generate  Cho present five rules for national risk manage-
growth, while the government provides the  ment, concluding, among other things, to:
regulatory and supervisory framework for
competitive markets, ensures the existence of  *  Establish fiscal discipline and price stability
level playing fields, and removes obvious cases  as the anchor of overall financial stability;
of moral hazard. But the private sector working
under an inappropriate financial structure may do  *  Encourage asset diversification through
no better than the government in making right  industrialization and export orientation, financed
investrnent choices for lonF -term growth. So  by foreign direct investment;
governments (wlich  in a financial crisis are
responsible for all national debts) should have an  *  Avoid sectoral imbalances, such as exces-
effective nationat risk management strategy, with  sive domestic or external borrowing, including
an understandip-, of the national balance sheet,  the development of instruments and institutions
and the necessity of a stable financial structure  to absorb shocks;
for steady  long-term  economic  growth.
* Establish strong institutional capacity to
Sheng and Cho argue that it is not only hiow  assess and contain systemic risks; and
much investment is mobilized and allocate(. but
also how investments are financed that matters  *  When the above conditions are not ad-
for an economy's long-term growth. Finance and  equately met, retain some policy measures to
development are inextricably linked with risk  handle the risk.
management (both at the sectoral and national
levels).
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I.  Introduction
Conventional  development  economics  has focused  mainly  on generating  economic  growth
through the mobilization of savings and the allocation of these savings among investment
opportunities. The mobilization  of savings involved  encouraging  external savings as well as
generating  domestic  savings  through  tax incentives  and interest rate policies. Allocation  of these
savings often involved  direct government  intervention  in the investment  process.
After the disastrous  results of the 1980s, the new wisdom relies on the private sector to
generate growth with the government relegated to the role of regulation and supervision  of
competitive  markets,  ensuring  the existence  of level playing fields, and removing  obvious cases
of moral hazard.
However, even this new wiseom neglects the  importance of  how investments are
financed,  i.e., the financial  structure,  and the implications  of financing  for the stability  and long-
term growth of the economy.  Experience  suggests that imperfect governm-nts  are not adept
in picking the winners on long-term investments,  but imperfect  private entrepreneurs  working
under an inappropriate  financial  structure  might not do better.  Effective  risk management  at the
national  level will result in a stable financial  structure  that is critical to the achievement  of steady
long-term economic  growth.
In the 1980s, many developing  countries experienced financial distress, external and
domestic, which has carried over into the 1990s. Between 1982-1990,  more than 50 countries
had to  reschedule their foreign debt, and more than 40 countries were involved in  major
domestic bank restructuring.  This same financial distress is now occurring in many of the
former socialist economies  in transition to market economies. The clear lesson that emerges
from the last decade's experience  is that once a country  through  poor risk management  stumbles
into financial  distress, the resulting  cost is enormous. Making  up for the losses of the banldng
system, re-establishing  the confidence  and the credibility  of the government policies and the
banking system, and recovering international  credit standing takes time, and in the process,
economic  growth and welfare suffer for a substantial  period.  In contrast, the countries that
avoided major domestic  financial  instability  and rescheduling  of foreign loans enjoyed interest
rates  significantly below LIBOR, retained access to  international financial markets, and
benefitted  from substantial  foreign investment  flows (Demirguic-Kunt  and Detragiache, 1992).
The path of economic transition which many developing  countries are currently going
through involves a high risk of financial  instability, especially when their product and export
markets are not well diversified.  Moreover, the developing  economy does not have a well
established institutional and legal framework for effective bank supervision  and deep capital
markets to cushion shocks.  Newly emerging enterprises in these countries are highly geared,
with low managerial  and financial  skills, operating in a repressed financial market and highly
distorted interest rate structure.  Their access to the international capital market and credit2
standing  are also more fragile compared  to OECr1  countries. In such a situation, relative price
changes during  the economic  transition  can easily worsen  banks' loan portfolio. An initial small
external shock to a  fragile financial environment can quickly lead to  higher country risk
premiums and drastically  curtail availability  of foreign capital. Worse, capital flight can create
an economy-wide  crisis unless the policy makers are able to contain the vulnerability  through
maintaining  sufficient  reserves and administrative  capacity to handle the crisis.
Therefore, perceived and actual risks of financial  instability  are substantially  higher in
developing  countries  than  in industrial  countries. This is likely  to become  more accentuated  over
time, as the intemationalization  of banking and further capital account liberalization  increases
the ease of capital flight and at the same time reduces the effectiveness  of traditional  macro-
economic  management  tools.
Under this environment, govemments may have to  devote more attention towards
prudential risk management  and establishing  stable financial  structures, even though this may
involve some  short-term  cost of foregone investment  and apparently  higher profit opportunities.
H.  From Corporate  Finance to National Finance
Recently  many economists  have  stressed the importance  of the processes  ard institudons
by which capital is allocated, and the role of financial  institutions  in selection or screening of
investment  projects, as well as their monitoring  function (Bencivenga  and Smith 1991, Diamond
1991, Gertler and Rose 1992, Levine 1992, Scharfstein 1992, Stiglitz 1989).  For example,
Stiglitz  (1989)  emphasized  that the way how financing  arrangements  are made for firms affects
how risks are shared between the firms and investors, and how incentives  for the managers  are
structured.  A similar argument can be extended to the national level.  That is,  the way a
country finances its industries and development  has significant implications  on how risks are
shared and managed  at the national level and for long-term  economic  growth of the country.
This paper argues that it is not only how much investment  is mobilized  and allocated
but also how investments  are financed that matters for the long-term growth of an economy.
The new paradigm suggested  in this paper is that finance and development  is inextricably  tied
into the question  of risk management,  not only at the firm level, but at the macro-national  level.
An important  point of departure in this new paradigm is that development  is a function  not just
of promoting the right industries and allocating  capital for the high return investments  (let us
call this asset management), but also of choosing  the right rinancial structure (let us call this
liability management), and the related risks arising from the choice of liability mix.  The
traditional developm it  economics focussed mainly on  the  former, but  largely neglected
implication  of the latter for the long-term  growth of an economy. It has been argued by many
observers that the success of East Asian economies was due largely to their government's
success  in picking  winners and financing  these through  policy-based  lending. Few have pointed3
out that the successful  risk management  by these  government  has been a crucial element for the
long-term  success of their econoir  >1.
This paper proceeds as foliov-.  The next Section explains why risk management  is so
important for the steady long-terr., growth with simple intuitive examples and cross-country
analyses.  Section IV discusses some important  rules of effective  risk management. The last
section summarizes  and concludes  the paper.
III.  Why is Risk Management So Important?
Let us take some simple heuristic  examples  to see why risk management  is so important
in the long-run.
Asset management. The intuitive  logic of this argument  on the asset side is very simple.
Suppose  there are two economies  whose growth  potential  and expected  rates of return on capital
investment  are similar,  with similar  levels of education,  wage rate and technology  etc..  Country
A has a more concentrated  asset mix than country  B, and accordingly  the risk (as measured  by
the standard deviation of returns) is higher.  In period one, both countries make the same
amount of investments  financed  identically  partly by domestic  bank loans and partly by foreign
loans. Suppose  in period two, an external shock  affects  badly the heavily concentrated  industries
in country A.  As a result, A's current account  deficit  deteriorates  and ex-post economic  growth
rate becomes lower than expected.  A's  banking system becomes loaded with substantial
nonperforming  loans and foreign  debt may have to be rescheduled. In contrast, country B may
be able to achieve the growth rate more or less as expected  because of the stabilizing  effects  of
industries not affected by the external shock (standard  deviation of returns are low due to the
diversification). In period three, country  A will face difficulties  in access to external  borrowing
as a result of its poorer economic performance.  This will forc. it to curtail or reduce its
investment  plan, depreciate the exchange  rate and face higher domest;c inflation. In addition,
access to foreign loans may cost substantially  higher than country B.  This suggests  that even
though countries  may have started with similar economic  conditions, over the long term,
a country with a more diversified  mix of assets can perform  better than the country with
a  concentrated  asset mIx.  2
Liability management. On the liabilities  side, suppose there are two economies  with
similar initial economic conditions, products and export mix, but with different financing
strategies. In period one, firms in country  A financed  their investment  exclusively  through  bank
I  For a recent view that prudent macroeconomic  policies matter in avoiding  external debt crises by Asian
economies,  see Ishrat Hussain  (1991).
2  Brignoli  and Seigel (1988) show that, even though the expected  rate return of assets are intertempomaly
independent,  the assets  with higher risk (standard  deviation)  will end up with lower growth in the long-run.4
loans  while firms in country B financed  largely through  capital and internal finance 3. In period
two, with an external shock, country A's banking svstem is more likely to be loaded with
nonperforming  loans, while country B's enterprise sector would be cushioned largely by its
capital base. Therefore, the higher the corporate sector leveragc :. a country, the higher is the
risk of instability  of the financial  sector. In period three, the loss of confidence  in country A's
banking system  and the financial  disintermediation  would result in lower investment  and growth
performance. State rescues of ailing enterprises and banks have enormous  fiscal costs 4, while
the required stabilization  efforts to contain the inflationary  consequences  of fiscal bail-outs  can
also da.npen  economic  growth. Bank  restructuring  and re-establishing  depositor  confidence  take
time and domextic  investment  and economic  recovery may suffer significantly  in the interim.
A similar argument can be made with respect to financing  at the national level.  If we
regard domestic financing as  self-finance  or  equity capital, a  country which finances its
investment mostly  by domestic savings  is likely to absorb external shoclks  better than one with
a high reliance on external debt.  While the volume of investments  may be constrained  by the
limits of  domestie savings, the country as a whole may be less vulnerable to  changes in
international  interest rates and on exogenous  reduction  in access to foreign  funds than a country
heavily dependent  on foreign borrowing.
On the other hand, if a country relies mainly  on foreign  direct investment  to finance its
domestic  investment,  it may be able to achieve  both higher and more stable patterns of growth,
since foreign equity capital is another external shock absorber. 5 Accordiingly,  the total risk
exposure  of a country depends  not only on its assets mix, but also its liability  mix. Other things
being equal, the higher a country is leveraged  either  through domestic  or foreign debt, the
more volatile its economic performance, with likely long-term consequences  of  poorer
economic  growth.
Table 1 compares  the growth  performance  of 98 developing  countries (on which data is
available) according to their external indebtedness:  high debt countries with average foreign
debt/GNP ratio over 50 percent and low debt countries  with the ratio below 50 percent during
1971-1990. The table suggests that there is a correlation between the debt ratio and growth
performance,  although  this does not imply there is a clear causality between the two variables.
It shows that the growth performance  of high debt countries was significantly  poorer than the
growth performance of  countries with low debt.  It  also shows that high  debt countries
I A!though  domestic  saving  levels may be the same, country A savings are assumed  to be in the household
sectr,  which  are on-lent via the banking  system  to the corporate  sector, while country  B savings  are mainly  in the
corporate  sector  or in household  savings  channeled  through  NBFIs  or securities  market  for equity  investment  in the
corporate  sector.
4  In Chile, for example, these costs incurred  over the period 1982-85  have been estimated  at 44 percent of
Chile's 1985  GNP (Fischer  and Reisen 1992).
5  See Atiyas and Dietz (1992) on how firms with foreign equity are more resilient to financial distress in
Colombia.5
experienced more unstable growth with significantly  higher inflation rate than the low debt
countries.
Table 1:  Growth Performance  of High Debt vs. Low Debt Countries (1971-1990)
High Debt Countries'  Low Debt Countries
(38 countries)  (63 countries)
Average annual real GDP  2.7  4.5
growth rate(%)
Standard deviation  of  16.8  1.7
growth rate 2
Average annual inflation  56.4  16.8
(CPI: %)
'High  debt countries  are those whose  average foreign  debt was higher than 50 percent of their GDP and low debt
countries  are those with the ratio below 50 percent during 1971-1990.
2 Mean-adjusted  standard deviation.
Source: World Bank National  Account Database,
World Debot  Tables, various issues, World Bank
Intemational  Financial  Statistics,  IMF
One interesting  comparison  may be the different  growth  patterns achieved be-tween  two
resource rich countries: Malaysia and Ghana.  At the point of independence  in  1957, both
countries inherited strong administrative  machinery, high education levels and high external
reserves. Their major products  and expurts were however highly  concentrated  on commodities:
Malaysia on rubber and tin and Ghana on cocoa and gold.  Beginning in the late 1960s,
Malaysia adopted an export diversification strategy, introducing one major export prmduct
roughly every five years: timber, palm oil, oil and gas, and finally manufacturing,  financed
significantly  by foreign direct investments. On the other hand, 99 percent of Ghana's exports
were concentrated  on primary commodities  in 1965, improving  only slightly to 92 percent by
1989  (Table  4).  While  both countries  undertook  different  historical  paths, and other factors  also
have affected the actual growth outcome, the diversified  economy achieved more stable and
higher annual average  growth rate (6.9%) over the period 1965-89,  even though both countries
started with almost comparable levels of per capita income in  1965 (Ghana US$260 and
Malaysia  US$330).
Without underemphasizing  other factors in the political economy  of growth, the point
here is that different national risk management  strategies: asset diversification  and openness to
foreign  direct investment  (liability management)  does matter in terms of long-run  growth.6
Table 2:  Export Concentration,  Growth  and Stability of Economies
of Ghana  and Malaysia (1965-1989)
Ghana  Mala  -ia
Siare of primary commodities  99 (1965)  94 (1965)
exports in total exports (%)'  92 (1989)  56 (1989)
Average annual growth rate  1.4  6.9
Standard deviation  of growth rate 2 4.1  0.49
Average annual inflation (CPI: %)  45.3  4.6
Memo items:
Per capita income (US$)
1965  260  330
1989  390  2,160
Share of fuels, minerals,  metals  and other primary  commodities  in total merchandise  exports.
2  Mean-adjusted  standard  deviation.
Source: World Development  Report, 1991
Intemational  Financial  Statistics,  IMF
We also compared the growth performance  of developing  countries during the period
1965-89  for two groups of countries, based on the degree of diversification  of their production
and exports.  The countries which have significantly  diversified  their production and exports
between 1965 and 1989 experienced  more stable and higher growth rates than those countries
which  did not improve their production  and export diversification  significantly  during the period
Tables 3 and 4.  Again, this does not imply the causality  between  the two variables  but suggests
a correlation between them.7
Table 3:  Producti;n Diversification  and
Growth Performance  of Developing  Countries  (1965-1989)
Significantly  diversified  Not significantly
countries (36)'  diversified  countries (40)
Average annual growth rate (%)  5.1  3.2
Standard  deviation  of growth rate  1.38  2.73
'Couwtries which reduced  the share of agriculture  ir. total CDP more than 5 percentages  points  between 1965  and
1989.
Source: World Development  Report, 1991
International  Financial  Statistics,  IMF
Table 4:  Exports Diversification  and Growth
Performance  of Developing  Countries  (1965-1989)
Significantly  diversified  Not significantly
countries (31)1  diversified  countries  (37)
Average annual growth rate (%)  4.6  3.5
Standard deviation  of growth rate 2 1.31  2.4
1 Countries  which reduced the share of primary commodities  in total exports more than 10 percentage  points
between 1965  and 1989.
Source: World Development  Report, 1991
International  Financial  Statistics,  IMF
IV.  National  Risk Management
The concept of managing an economy like a corporate firm is not new.  One of the
remarkable features of high economic growth in East A ian economies  has been their rapid
growth with low inflation. Aside from the usual explanatory  variables such as well educated
human  capital, outward-looking  industrial  and trade policies, an "institutional"  or "managerial'
view is that policy makers managed  these economies  (and their finances)  as if they were single
corporations: Japan Inc, Korea Inc, and Malaysia Inc.  Some observers argue that resource
allocation  -,l  these economies may behave similarly to large multi-national  corporations:  they
may be guided by market signals, but the allocation of the resources and risks among various8
competing  sectors  are not necessarily  through  market  arrangements. However, it may  very well
be that a major point of departure in economic management  in these economies is not the
intervention  in credit allocation,  but how these governments  absorb risks of the private sector,
or co-insure  such risks with the private sector during the development  process. In other words,
there may have been risk management  strategies  that have encouraged  private sector growth,
without  the usual negative effects of direct government  intervention.
National  risk management  is a relatively  new concept. Policy-makers  and regulators in
general are quite coinfortable with sectoral risl: management, with particular focus on risk
reduction  or amelioration  rules and regulations  for the behavior of firms in a single sector or
financial  institutions,  including  the containment  of systemic risks. It is rare, on the other hand,
for ministries of finance or central banks to see the "big picture" in risk management. For
example, a common problem in  many developing countries in the  1980s was the lack of
coordinated risk  management in  its  debt (liability) management versus reserves (assets)
management. A ministry  of finance  is likely to minimize  debt servicing  costs by concentrating
on low interest-rate currency borrowing, subjecting the nation to  substantial risks of high
revaluation  losses in the future.  On the other hand, reserves management  under a central bank
would  tend to concentrate  on high liquidity  with consequent  low yields that may be optimal  from
the central bank's objectives, but may have a currency mix that does not minimize the net
foreign currency exposure of the nation  as a whole.
There are  several reasons for  this  oversight.  The  first  is  the  segmentation of
responsibility  within the government  itself. The incentives  within the government  require each
ministry or  agency to  optimize its  own objective functions, even though these  may be
contradictory  and sub-optimal  for the nation as a whole.  The second is even more basic, and
is related to the severe data inadequacies  available  to the typical policy-maker. The national
accounts of most LDCs are by and large flow accounts, with almost no sectoral or national
balance sheets. 6 Thus, a Minister of Finance cannot engage in asset-liability  management  like
a corporate treasurer even if he wanted to, because he would not have the current information
available to do so.  Most governments  do not even maintain a balance sheet.  Cash based
government  accounting  disguise  the detrimental  effects of off-balance  expenditure  and hide the
consequences  of large quasi-fiscal  deficits 7.
As a result of these data inadequacies,  fiscal adjustments  may not have  been adequate  in
many cases where the governments had absorbed substantial amounts of  off-balance sheet
liabilities, such as a deposit  insurance,  credit insurance  for sectoral  programs and exchange  rate
guarantees. A major lesson of 1980s  is that in a financial  crisis, the government  is responsible
I For example,  the lack  of national  balance  sheets,  particularly  outstanding  stock of FDI in many  countries
would  not facilitate  a comparison  of debt/equity  structure  across  countries.
' In other  words,  the non-transparency  of government  accounting  does not assist  to enforce  the hard  budget
constraint  on governments,  which can easily resort  to off-budget  expenditure  and monetary  creation  to escape
financial  discipline.9
for all national  debt. irrespective  whether it was incurred by the private sector.  The Chilean
crisis of 1982-85,  for example,  required the Government  to fully  guarantee  all domestic  deposits
as well as the external  debt of the private sector (Velasco, 1991). This was most dangerous  for
fiscal and monetary  stability, because in a recession, while government  revenue falls sharply,
larger resources  are required to service  not only the government's  growing  domestic  and external
debt, but also to cover private sector external liabilities,  as well as losses in a banking system
that is subject  to a government  (implicit  or explicit) deposit  guarantee.
National balance sheet
Accordingly,  it would be useful to develop  a notion of a national  balance  sheet for the
effective risk management  of an economy.  Just as corporate managers manage their risk by
changing  the structure  of their assets  and liabilities,  policy  makers  may  have to manage  domestic
and systemic  risks through  appropriate  rules and regulations  that shift the national  asset-liability
mix.
At a minimum, the national balance sheet should distinguish between four domestic
sectors: government,  enterprises, households  and the financial  sector, and an external sector.'
The importance  of identifying sectoral balance sheets is to distinguish how different sectors
finance  their asset base, and how financial  imbalances  in one sector  could trigger  off imbalances
in other sectors.  Indeed, the building of stable financing structure (the liabilities side of the
national balance sheet) has been a major pre-occupation  of financial sector reform efforts in
recent years.
As a result of recent experiences  in market shocks in the process of internationalization
of banking, as well as the global harmonization  of regulation  of banking  and financial  markets,
some of the risks in national asset-liability  management  have become  better (but not yet fully)
understood. These risks may be categorized  into the following:
*  Market risks (interest  rates, exchange  rates, prices etc);
*  Credit or default risks
*  Regulatory  risks
*  Liquidity  risks
*  Fraud risks
*  Systemic  risks
Clearly, the government has a major role in all of these risk categories, either as a
market  participant  or regulator. For example, macro-economic  policies  of the government  will
I From a national point of view, the national net wealth may be defined  as the sum of domestic  assets  (land,
equipment  and intellectual  property)  plus financial  claims  on foreigners  (including  foreign  exchange  reserves), less
external claims on the economy, including  extemal short-term  and long-term  debt, as well as foreign  direct and
portfolio  investment  in domestic  corporations. Such  a 'net'  national  balanc^  sheet  would  unfortunately  not be able
to distinguish  the large intemal sectoral imbalances  that could  jeopardize  growth within  an economy.10
have a  major impact on relative prices: interest rates, exchange rates and domestic prices.
Relative price changes, plus Government  action or inaction in the legal, accounting and debt
recovery framework will affect sectoral solvency and hence determine the size of credit or
default risks.  Arbitrary or  sudden changes in government regulations, such as closing of
markets, impositOn of exchange controls or  nationalization  of banks are  major regulatory
(sometimes  called political) risks.  Similarly, macro-management  of liquidity has significant
influence on  liquidity at the enterprise level.  Enforcement of  laws deter fraud behavior.
Finally, only the government  can insure systemic  risks or shocks to the economy as a whole.
National  risk management  in a fully open economy  is complicated  by the fact that the
private sector can always hedge its own risks through  capital flight.  Mistakes in government
policy can easily trigger capital flight and worsen macro-economic  management. This has the
impact of reducing  the options of governments  to tax wealth  and income during a crisis to pay
for losses.
Consequently,  just as a firm  will have to have  a good understanding  of its risk exposures,
a policy maker may well have to have a "big picture"  of risk exposures  in the national  balance
sheet, so as to manage these risks such that shocks (external, political or natural) will not
jeopardize the economy from its potential long-term growth path.  For various reasons, East
Asian policy makers have tended to follow several basic rules of risk management  in their
national  asset-liability  management.  These  are not risk-averse  strategies,  but strategies  to ensure
that high risk-taking  are properly financed  and managed.
Managing  financial  stability: some basic rules
Those rules can be summarized as follows: (1) establish fiscal discipline and price
stability; (2) encourage asset diversification  through industrialization  and outward-orientation;
(3) avoid  large sector financial  imbalances,  including  excessive  domestic  and external  borrowing
and develop financial  instruments  and institutions  to cushion shocks; (4) establish institutional
and administrative  capacity to  assess and contain systemic risks; and (5) when the above
conditions  are not adequately met, retain some policy measures  to handle the risk.
(1)  Establishing  Fiscal Discipline  and Price Stability
With few exceptions, those countries which experienced  financial instability suffered
badly in the face of high inflation  and volatile relative  price changes. Inflation  distorts relative
prices, turn real interest rate negative  when they are controlled, or add high risk premium to
interest rates where they are liberalized.  As a result, funds shift towards speculation  in non-
tradeables, investment  horizons shorten, and financial  disintermediation  takes place.
High inflation also tends to make the exchange  rate unstable, leading to overshooting  or
undershooting  of the exchange rate if not carefully managed. These market volatility  can de-
capitalize  firms  rapidly, pushing  them  towards  distressed  borrowing,  deter long-term  investments11
and  reduce domestic production that leads to  higher inflation.  Price  volatility distorts
transparency  of information to all market participants, raising information search costs and
creating rent seeking opportunities.  High market risks have a cost that lowers growth and
efficiency  in the long run.
In most developing  countries,  the main culprit  for high inflation  are large budget  deficits.
The existence of growing budgetary deficits raises "regulatory risks" - that the government
would finance itself either through heavier taxation or  inflation tax,  or  both.  Once the
sustainability  of government  expenditure  is ques  tioned,  tax avoidance  behavior  increases. Where
the government has been lax on its own financial discipline, it can hardly impose financial
discipline on the private sector as the latter has greater incentives for speculation  and moral
hazard behavior  (Sheng 1991). Therefore, tax reforms, expenditure  control and achieving  price
stability  are important steps to secure financial  stability  and the robust growth of the financial
sector.  Fiscal discipline  is the anchor of financial  sector stability.  East Asian economies  in
general have maintained  very prudent fiscal stances  and maintained  low inflation rates.
(2) Asset diversification
From a portfolio diversification  point of view, capital stocks in different industries,
investments  in infrastructure  and foreign  exchange  reserves  may  be viewed  as alternative  assets.
Simple risk diversification  theory suggests that risk is minimized  when resources are spread
widely in  assets that have negative or  low correlation with each other.  Thus, in  highly
concentrated  economies  which  depend  on one key commodity,  such as oil, a risk-reducing  long-
term investment  strategy is not to invest in domestic  assets (such as property or shares) which
are highly correlated with the fortunes of the oil market, but to hold high foreign exchange
reserves.
Another way of looking at asset diversification  is to view the over-concentration  of
ownership of resources, whether in the private or public sectors, as risk-prone  in the long run,
and therefore  resources should  be distributed  in a competitive  environment  that engender  lower
risks  and higher efficiency.  While there are  risks associated with  industrialization, the
broadening  of national output widens the tax base, reduces  volatility of production and current
account position through diversification of  markets and  export earnings.  From  a  risk
diversification  strategy point of view, high protection  policies  expose the nation to higher risks
in the long run since resources are likely to be concentrated  in inefficient  import substituting
industries.  The development  of export-oriented  industries is risk-reducing in the long run
because the larger pool of foreign exchange earnings can sustain a higher level of external
financing.  The East Asian economies  rewarded export earners by allowing them access in
foreign exchange to acquire imported technology  and equipment, thus encouraging firms to
remain competitive  at the international  level.  On the other hand, many developing  countries
violated the basic financing rule of using external borrowing only to finance assets that earn
foreign exchange  (Fischer, 1991). Consequently,  they were subject  to severe foreign  exchange
constraints in times of worsening terms of trade.12
Inducing foreign direct investment  for the development  of new industries  is an effective
way for a country tv reduce the risk of the economy: it reduces the risk by diversifying  the
assets and sharing the remaining  risk with foreign  partners. Liberalization  of trade and foreign
direct investment  are therefore good policy measures  for effective  risk management  as well as
for the promotion of industrial growth within the context of neoclassical  framework.
While it may not be clear that private investment  is the major source of growth, Figure
1 suggests  that low levels of private investment  are correlated  with low levels of growth.
(3)  Building  stable financial  structures
As discussed  above, national  liability  management  can shape  the financial  structure. The
"safest" liability  is equity.  For example, a firm which finances its investments  wholly through
internal  equity, would  be able to cushion  itself much  better against  interest rate or other external
shocks than a highly leveraged firm. The risk of over-diversification  of debt can be seen from
the problems of borrowers in debt negotiations.  The more creditor banks are involved, the
higher the risks of delay in debt resolution,  which  worsens  the financial  position  of the distressed
borrower.  An economy  that relies solely in domestic  saving  would be much less vulnerable  to
external shocks, but its growth may be constrained because of limited domestic resources.
Accordingly,  economies  are also subject to the debt versus equity issue facing corporate firms.
Debt versus equity
Given different corporate objectives  and changing  market conditions,  there is no single
optimal structure of debt/equity  ratio for a firm 9 nor an optimal financial  market structure for
an economy.  However, just as a firm builds up capital and liquidity as a cushion against
unpredictable  market risks, a nation should maintain  from a risk management  point of view a
financial  structure  that can absorb shocks.
Equity capital has a distinct advantage  over debt in that risk is shared between the user
and provider of capital and there is no fixed obligation  to repay the equity holder." 0 Equity
capital is therefore  an important  cushion  to economic  shocks  and business cycles.  The lessons
of the 1980s  suggest that excessive  borrowing  in one sector  can rapidly  destabilize  the economy
as a whole.  Accordingly,  building  strong equity bases in the corporate sector, reducing credit
I There is considerable  active discussion  on the optimal  financial  structure  at the firm level. The discussion  on
the optimal  debt/equity  structure  in the finance  literature  can be broadly  classified  into: (i) tax implications  on the
optimal  capital (Miller 1977, Modigliani  1982), (ii) agency  cost approach  to optimal  capital (Jensen  and Meckling
1976,  Diamond  1986,  Jensen 1986,  Hirshlcifer  and Thakor 1989,  Haris and Raviv 1990  and etc.), (iii)  asymmetric
information  approach to optimal capital (Ross 1977, Myers and Majluf 1984 and etc.),  and (iv) industrial
organization  approach to optimal  capital (Brander  and Lewis 1986).  See Demirguc-Kunt(1992)  for a survey of
recent literature.
10  Although  equity  capital has distinct advantage  over debt with respect to risk sharing, outside equity  capital
has disadvantage  with respect to incentive  issues.  Because  entrepreneurs  do not have a fixed commitment  ( and
because  they must share the retums to their effort with the other shareholders)  incentives  are attenuated  (Stiglitz
1989). Ex post, debt could also  provide  a certain  degree  of risk sharing through  debt reductions  and reschedulings.13
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concentration,  strengthening  capital  adequacy  and loan loss reserves  in the financial  sector, and
improving  public sector saving are all consistent  tools of national risk management.
The nation can build up domestic equity capital in several ways: promoting retained
earnings, encouraging foreign direct or portfolio investment, privatization  and building stock
markets.  Stock markets were not major players in capital mobilization  for enterprises in the
early stages of development  of  the East Asian economies.  In the Meiji period, the large
Japanese conglomerates  were first formed from the privatization  of state-owned  industries in
armaments, shipbuilding, steel and mining.  East Asian economies have tended to  use a
combination  of low (but positive  in real terms) lending  rates, with tax disincentives  against high
dividends, to encourage  the accumulation  of retained earnings and corporate savings. On the
whole perhaps with the exception  of Japan and Korea, these economies  were open to foreign
equity capital, especially foreign direct investment  for long-term industrial investment which
introduced new technology, managerial skills or new markets."  The risk of investment is
shared between domestic  and foreign investors.
Stock markets became  more important  as banking  practices, law and accot-ting became
more established.  Medium and large sized firms were able to access new equity to expand
production  at cheaper rates than bank borrowing. However, active stock markets create a new
dimension  of risk, since they act as a barometer  of public confidence. When an economy  is not
yet  stable,  rapid  inflows and  outflows of  short-term foreign portfolio investment could
complicate monetary control and magnify macroeconomic  instability.  Moreover, while the
domestic  securities  market  is not well  developed  and small, foreign  portfolio  investment  may  not
be a major option for inducing foreign equity capital.  Consequently,  in the early stages of
development,  a country may have to rely mainly on promoting corporate savings and foreign
direct investments  to develop  a stronger  domestic  equity  base to finance long term investments.
Development  of diversified  financial  instruments
Just as corporations  and banks are concerned  with their individual  interest rate risks, an
economy should be concerned with its interest rate and maturity structures of domestic and
foreign liabilities. The soundness  of "never borrow short to lend long" and "never lend fixed
rates and finance with variable rate" was clearly demonstrated  by the US Savings and Loan
crisis, where fixed rate long term mortgage loans were financed with short-term variable rate
deposits. Sharp interest rate increases  in 1981  decapitalized  one segment  of the financial  sector.
Many developing  countries  have also violated  these rules, by using credit directives  to banks to
finance long-term  investments  (infrastructure  plus corporate investments)  at fixed rates through
the variable rate short-term deposits, thus creating large maturity mismatches  in their banking
systems. Development  banks were not generally  successful  because  of their high concentration
of risky loans  at fixed rates, without  a stable  long-term  funding  base. Inappropriate  interest rate
policies, directed loans, and large interest rate and maturity mismatches  were major causes of
financial  sector insolvencies  in the 1980s. A striking feature of the ability of some East Asian
" See Caprio, Gelb, and Johnson  (1989) for the discussion  of measures  to promote foreign  direct investment.15
economies, such as Japan, Singapore, and Malaysia to  sustain high fiscal deficits was the
existence  of strong contractual  or postal savings institutions.
Developing countries should therefore design financial systems with more diversified
instruments  and markets  which  are better able  to transform  and intermediate  risks. Development
of long-term financial  instruments  and equity markets  (either through  the development  of public
securities market or development  of institutions  which provide equity capital) would help to
contain the risk of financial  instability.
Management of foreign exchange risks
Major errors have been made in the management  of foreign exchange risks in many
developing countries in  the 1980s.  First, many developing countries kept their currencies
underdepreciated in  the  fear  of  inflationary impact of  depreciation.  An  increasing
underdepreciation of  the  domestic exchange rate  relative to  domestic inflation reduces
competitiveness,  encourages  consumption  and a major shift towards  non-tradeables,  particularly
speculation in property.  Thus, subsequent abrupt exchange rate adjustments impose severe
losses on private sector firms with external debt and strains the debt servicing capacity of the
budget. East Asian governments  have  generally  maintained  fairly stable real exchange  rates and
avoided using the exchange  rate as an anti-inflation  tool.  By and large, East Asian economies
maintainted  high foreign  exchange reserves relative to imports or external debt.
Second, government external debt management  have only belatedly tried to  reduce
currency mismatches, by borrowing mainly in currencies of the country's export earnings.
Initial borrowings in low interest currencies  have caused  large foreign  exchange  losses in many
borrowers, which have probably been larger in magnitude  than five credit losses of the banking
system.
Third, unrestricted  access to foreign borrowing by firms not used to foreign exchange
risks may cause major problems.  Both in the Chilean  and Argentinean  banking crises of the
1980s, the lenders in essence forced the government  to take over the external debt of failing
private borrowers, with substantial  fiscal impact.  Almost all East Asian economies  have been
reluctant to allow unrestricted  access to foreign  borrowing  by domestic firms until very late in
the sequencing  of financial  liberalization  reforms.
Finally, a major error was loading central banks with net foreign exchange liabilities.
Such central banks were caught with the dilemma  of maintaining  an exchange rate that would
balance the current account  of the balance of payments  or their own solvency. Allowing the
exchange rate to depreciate  would worsen the central bank's own financial  position.  In some
cases, central  banks were prepared  to allow  an overvaluation  of the exchange  rate to protect their
own solvency,  resulting  in massive  relative price distortions  in the economy. In contrast, most
East Asian central banks preferred to maintain  high foreign  exchange  reserves with no foreign
exchange liabilities  in their balance sheets other than reserve money, and were therefore able
to conduct exchange rate management  in an autonomous  and financially  stable manner.  The
notable exception  was the Philippines.16
(4)  Institutional  and Legal Framework  for Bank Supervision
The strategies  discussed above will reduce system-wide  risks.  However, the financial
system could be still fragile if banks do not select sound  and profitable  borrowers, and monitor
and enforce loan contracts effectively. The business of banking  and finance is essentially  the
business of public confidence. The public at large and market participants  more specifically
expect a degree of official surveillance over the system in which credit and credibility is a
unifying  force (Corrigan 1987). The financial  sector should  therefore  be closely monitored  and
supervised  by the government.
An important function of financial  sector supervision  is to develop an institutional  and
legal framework for enforcing debt contracts, measuring and reporting the  solvency and
efficiency  of borrowers and lenders, and to ensure that systemic  risks and sectoral imbalances
are not such that the soundness  and safety of the financial  system is jeopardized.  Where the
financial  sector may  have  to intermediate  high risks, appropriate  instruments  and adequate  capital
should be put into place to support such activities.  In short, national risk management  is an
important  raison d'etre of effective  bank supervision.
(5)  Financial  sector liberalization  and risk management
Financial  sector liberalization  itself entails  high risks as well. A major  issue in the design
and sequencing  of economic  liberali;7ation  is to engender  change  without instability. Economic
liberalization  involve  changes  in relati  {e prices, which  have large wealth  and income  distribution
effects.  In the process, certain sectors may experience  rapid deteriuration  of their net worth.
The use of sectoral and national balance sheets can identify the effects of such relative price
changes and consequently  the risks associated  with price reforms.
A major lesson of recent financial sector reforms is that the fiscal costs (in terms of
actual as well as contingent liabilities)  of liberalization  could be very large (Caprio, 1992).
Large sectoral wealth  losses (such as enterprise or bank losses)  are shifted  to the budget, which
may not be in a position to digest such losses in one go, without losing monetary  and macro-
economic  stability. Indeed, when there are insufficient  national  resources, nor well established
institutional  framework  for prudential  regulation, to cushion  the shocks,  a country may have to
take an approach in which distortive regulations  are gradually removed, in parallel with the
deepening of capital markets, institutional building and supervisory capacity.  The proper
sequencing  is to remove those distortive regulations which can be removed without causing
major instability, while others are removed as the market and institutional  environments  are
mature enough to cushion  the impact  of deregulation. In general, this has been the approach  of
the East Asian economies.
Financial liberalization  in OECD countries have been much more successful, because
most OECD countries opened their financial  systems during the 1980s, when their financial
markets have become  mature and well diversified. They had the institutional  development  and
market depth to cushion  the shocks  arising  from market liberalization. They also can spread the
costs of external shocks  through time while most developing  countries do not have this option.
For example, recent banking and savings  and loan problems  did not hamper the US access to17
the international  capital market, while Korea, despite  its remarkable  economic  success, was on
the brink of losing access to voluntary  lending from time to time (Fisher and Reisen, 1992).
National risk management  therefore suggests that policy-makers  should have a clear
understanding of the potential risk exposures in their economy and financial sector.  This
requires good accounting and reliable reporting of sectoral risks, including sectoral balance
sheets  and net worth.  By making the full costs of policy  options more transparent, particularly
below the line (or quasi-fiscal)  costs of government guarantees  on private sector risk-taking
behavior, policy makers may be able to avoid the large costs associated  with taking short run
measures that have high long run costs.  For example, if policy makers do not foresee the
immediate improvement of government finances, it may be premature to liberalize external
capital transactions,  since the liberalization  may  strain scarce foreign  exchange  reserves, worsen
the national  debt, reduce the inflation  tax base and further destabilize  the economy.
V.  Summary and Conclusions
This paper argues that national  risk management  is critical for the achievement  of steady
long-term  economic  growth. The neoclassical  growth  theory focussed  mainly  on the right "asset
choice" without paying much attention to  the implication of  risks,  uncertainties and how
investments  are financed, i.e.,  "liability  choice" for the long-term  growth of an economy. The
experiences  of many  developing  countries  in the 1980s  indicate that once a country fails its risk
management  and stumbles  into financial  distress, the resulting  cost is enormous. In the process,
economic growth and  welfare suffers.  in  the long-run, prudential risk management and
establishing  stable financial  structure  are rewarded  with a steady and high economic  growth.
In order for policy makers to manage  risk effectively, they must have a "big picture"
on the national economy. Effective  risk management  at the sectoral  level does not necessarily
ensure effective risk management  at the national level.  Although  sectoral risk may be hedged
against the risk of other sectors, national risk may not be hedged  and therefore such risks must
be controlled by regulation and supervision. Just as corporations  controls firm risk based on
asset-liability management,  a policy maker should apply national asset-liability  management,
using a national balance sheet that clearly identifies  financial imbalances  and the effects on
sectoral net wealth due to changes in relative prices.
In general, the successful  East Asian economies  tended to manage their finances as if
their economies were single corporations, with a strategy for asset diversification,  and a
carefully managed financial structure that minimizes  systemic risks without retarding private
sector risk-taking.  Consequently, their financial sector reforms have been gradualist in
approach, but have been quite successful  in attaining  long-term stable growth.
Some general national risk management  rules can be established, based partly on well-
known corporate risk management rules: (1) create price stability (stable macro-economic
environment)  to reduce system-wide  risks and uncertainties  (and hence transactions costs) for
private  sector  initiative; fiscal  discipline is  a  key  anchor of  price  stability; (2)  asset
diversification:  broaden the production  and export (asset) structure  through  outward  orientation,
using foreign direct investment, to  ensure competitiveness  at international levels; build up18
foreign exchange reserves when the domestic asset base is highly concentrated; (3) liability
management: reduce national and  sectoral leverage by  strengthening the capital base  of
corporations and banks, including usage of  foreign direct investments; deepening domestic
financial markets; improve debt management  and avoid large  maturity, interest rate and
exchange  rate mismatches;  (4) develop  institutional  and administrative  capacity  to assess risk and
to contain systemic  risk; and (5) sequence  financial  sector liberalization  measures with a clear
understanding of  the risks involved, and with appropriate institutional strength and  fiscal
resources to manage  the transitional  process without losing macro-economic  stability.
In sum, the tortoise does win over the hare in the long run.19
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